ABSTRACT
In the summer of 43 the Roman world was rapidly polarising into two hostile portions: Caesarians in the West and the 'Liberators' in the East. Antonius had retreated into Gaul, but he was far from beaten. By the end of May, Lepidus as governor of Gallia Narbonensis had succumbed to the inevitable and joined him. In his correspondence, Lepidus had prevaricated and protested his loyalty to the Senate for as long as he could, waiting to see what would happen. He had no real taste for combat with Antonius, and no inclination to sacrifice himself and his army to no purpose. His soldiers were already fraternising with the enemy, and Antonius himself walked right up to his camp unopposed. Lepidus explained himself politely to the Senate, and made peace with his rival, insisting that it was the mood of his troops and his impossible situation that compelled him to join Antonius. Senatorial disgust with his actions prompted them to declare him a public enemy (hostis publkus) in June. His property was forfeited to the state, and his sons forbidden to hold office. Lepidus cannot have made his decisions lightly, despite many accusations, both contemporary and modern, that he vacillated through weakness of character. Antonius was already hostis as a result of Cicero's unstinting efforts, so the two Caesarians now shared a common status which threw them together for better or worse; they had nothing to gain by negotiation with the Senate, and nothing to lose except their lives by fighting. Antonius was now in command of a swelling force of auxiliary troops and eventually about twenty-two legions, three of them raised on the initiative of P. Ventidius Bassus, who had miraculously led his little army northwards through Italy, avoiding battle all the way; he crossed the Apennines, and reached Antonius just as he was retreating into Gaul. The opposition to Antonius and Lepidus comprised the joint armies of L. Munatius Plancus, governor of Gallia Comata, and Decimus Brutus. Technically, the troops of the young Caesar were also part of the opposition, but Caesar was determined to sit still and do nothing, a fact which Antonius presumably noted with interest. Immobile in Hispania Inferior, C. Asinius Pollio also waited upon events, another fact of which Antonius was doubtless fully aware. Of these main protagonists, Decimus Brutus was
the odd one out. He had been party to the murder of Caesar; all the rest were Caesar's men. It was only a matter of time before an immense power bloc formed in the West, armed and ready. The only questions were how soon could Antonius emerge at its head, and in what position would Octavian find himself when that happened.1
