ABSTRACT
This chapter, and its sequel, respectively on retribution, reconciliation and
resolution, continue our exploration of the fundamental liberal conundrum of
how a political and, above all, moral, system of thought can be imposed by one
or more (powerful) liberal state(s) on states that are not in that category through a
variety of ‘legal’ approaches to change. The whole idea of imposing liberal stan-
dards of justice after wars is based on the idea that this imposition will not only
be for the good of the liberal state doing the imposing but also on the illiberal
victim. The question for liberals has and will be: can outside (even liberal) forces
impose a democratic freedom on peoples that have not previously had it without
fundamentally breaching the basis of liberalism itself ? Moral autonomy has to be
learnt by the individual or the people, says Mill, not imposed. So how can we
square that with the use of force to make people free, especially if that results in
tribunals that may impose harsh sentences for illiberal acts, up to and including
the death penalty?
