ABSTRACT
Analysis of the international politics of the Middle East has long been polarized
between International Relations (IR) specialists, typically neo-realists, who
insist that universal rules apply to all regions1 and area specialists who defend
the cultural uniqueness, and consequent political exceptionalism of the Middle
East. More recent theoretical advances have sought, with only partial success, to
bridge this gap. Thus, constructivists supply a universal theory that takes
account of area-specific identity, yet seem to understate the weight of the
material factors stressed by realism; Buzan and Waever, advocates of a ‘thicker’
form of realism, acknowledge the importance of regional variations in material
structure without, however, paying much attention to identity per se. 2
The debate over the Middle East can be located within the larger one in IR
between those who advocate the primacy of material structures and those that
champion ideational factors – an argument already introduced by Gerd
Nonneman in chapter I.3 For what has been called the neo-utilitarians,4 the
dominating world system-level is constituted of material structures, specifically
the core-periphery hierarchy for Marxist structuralists and the global power
balance for neo-realism; these, outside of the control of most small powers,
largely constrain their behavior. This is because utilitarians assume states seek
material interests (wealth and power) and their strategies toward this end are
shaped by their position in systemic structures. For the mostly-weak Arab states,
this is normally one allowing limited autonomy from the core powers and
entailing threats from more powerful non-Arab neighbors and likely, therefore,
to induce ‘bandwagoning’ (appeasing more powerful states) that adapts to
material constraints (and opportunities). Identities and norms, for neo-
utilitarians, are merely used by state elites, either as instruments of power
(e.g. using foreign threats to stir up supportive nationalism) or to legitimize their
material interests.