ABSTRACT
There are two significant respects, however, in which the dynamics of collective decision-making differ in EU matters. First, the status of governmental decisions in EU matters is less definitive. Where once the British government took a decision and that was the end of the matter, its decisions on EUrelated matters can now only be ‘this is what our negotiating position must be’. For example, the Cabinet used to have an annual review that fixed British agricultural prices and subsidies. Now that responsibility has shifted to the EU Council of Ministers, the Cabinet simply determines what attitude its Agriculture Secretary should adopt in the negotiations. Second, and as a consequence of this, some of the Cabinet’s authority has to be devolved to the minister who carries out the negotiations, acting in consultation with the Prime Minister. The Cabinet approves a negotiating stance, but as negotiations in Brussels proceed, the minister on the spot must decide what to concede and what to stick on. For evident practical reasons, the Cabinet cannot be convened every time he has to adjust his negotiating position, so he either takes the responsibility himself or, if the issue is important, rings the Prime Minister for approval.
