ABSTRACT
It was argued in the previous chapter that the primitive form of value is the interest-inself-realization that is embodied in a self, or a self-maintaining system. This argument rested on an (undefended) assumption, namely that value is indeed conceptually tied to the existence of a valuer. In other words, in order for an entity to possess value, it must be at least potentially valuable for, or relative to, a valuer. This assumption leads us to exclude from consideration the kind of theory which assigns value to objects which are beyond the purview of possible valuers. I am content that this should be so, not because I have a ready refutation of such theories, but because my purpose here is simply to give content to the notion of intrinsic value in certain limited contexts. There may be other contexts in which the notion of intrinsic value is understood differently, and there are certainly complex and important fields of ethics, notably the field of inter-human interaction, that are not exhausted by the account I offer here. I accordingly make no claim to exhaustiveness for the value theory which follows. My aim is to develop a theory which prescribes a particular normative stance to Nature. The stance in question is basically ecocentric, but ecocentrism as I prescribe it is understood as having a bottomline significance-it rests on a fundamental moral principle, though this principle is not necessarily one to which all other moral principles may be reduced. With these qualifications in mind, then, I propose to identify three levels of value, where the value in question is in each case relativized to a valuer, or self.
