ABSTRACT
It might have been expected that the period immediately following the AIA would be one of more harmonious intergovernmental relations. The two governments had formalised their relationship and their roles regarding Northern Ireland. An internationally registered treaty had been signed which acknowledged the right of the Irish government to act as a spokesperson for the nationalist community in the North. The British had undertaken to co-operate with the Irish and make ‘determined efforts’ through the IGC to ‘resolve any differences’. The British concerns over cross-border security and extradition were to be addressed. In short the AIA was carefully constructed to cover, if not solve, the areas of tensions between the two governments. Yet anyone expecting that the AIA would usher in a more peaceful or less contentious period in either Anglo-Irish relations or Northern Ireland affairs was to be quickly and comprehensively disabused. By all visible indicators the three-and-a-half years between the signing of the AIA and its review were years of increased instability in Northern Ireland set against the backdrop of periodic public disputes between the two governments. To judge why this was the case it is necessary to briefly examine how the AIA was received in Northern Ireland, how it worked in practice, and what areas were still to be disputed between the two governments. Only then can an examination of the value and shortcomings of the Agreement be made.
