ABSTRACT

H ilarity erupts - “Short book!” - w henever I reveal that the subject o f this book is Italian w ar heroes: an oxym oron, I am assured, by Italians or foreigners, in Italy and outside, since “Italians are anything bu t” . V irtually everyone has an idea about the subject, inspired by superficial knowledge o f battles since the Risorgim ento, such as N ovara (1848), Adowa (1885), C aporetto (1917) and the debacle o f the Second W orld W ar. T h e consensus is tha t Italian society, whatever its o ther characteristics, and for good or ill, is not militarily inclined. Fascist attem pts to transform Italians simply dissolved into tragic slapstick. This im pres­ sion o f Italian disinclination for fighting has venerable roots and a long pedigree, dating back at least as far as Guicciardini. His portrayal o f bloodless condottieri cam paigns still holds sway am ong the literati. In the view of that rem arkable historian, Italians were content for m any years with the images of war, but not its substance, and at the critical m om ent they lacked the resolve to confront the “furore Jrancese”. H is portrayal o f m ercenary pseudo-war and bellicose posturing, “explains” the collapse o f Italian armies when confronted with the French inva­ sion o f 1494.1

This book will therefore address a historical enigma. After situating the place of Italian m ilitary com m anders, officers and adventurers at the close of the wars of Italy in 1 5 5 9 ,1 will chart their progress and decline. It is hard not to discern the progressive estrangem ent o flta lian society from m artial pursuits, over m ore than two centuries between Lepanto (1571) and the invasions by French revolutionary armies in the 1790s. G iven the extrem e diversity o f the m aterial available, and the uneven interest o f generations o f historians, some parts of this account will be m ore detailed than others. T h e treaty o f Cateau-Cam bresis in 1559 is probably a good place to begin, for it brought to a com plete halt the long series o f regional wars devastating most o f the peninsula over m ore than half a century'. T he treaty imposed a Pax Hispanica on the peninsula, followed by the dem obilization o f the captains and their soldiers. If one can argue that Italian society was militarily am ateurish at the end o f the fifteenth century, this was certainly untrue after two

generations of ‘decisive battles’ like Fornovo, R avenna, M arignano and Pavia, and of great sieges like those of Rom e, Naples and Siena. I f Italy was a battlefield for m ercenaries hailing from Andalusia to Switzerland, nevertheless Italian knights, mercenaries, militias and cities were caught up in the fighting m ore than they cared. By the time of Napoleon, however, the passivity o flta lian states to his conquering armies revealed both a lack o f spirit, and a lack o f m eans, w ith which to resist the invader. T he peninsula (with the notable exception o f Piedmont) had dem ilitarized to such an extent that the Italian states considered organized resist­ ance to be im practical and hopeless. Bonaparte in tu rn cam e to realize the full extent o f it as he strove to create a m odern, efficient, and disciplined arm y from scratch. O ver a century later, would-be Fascist warlords sought to com plete this process.