ABSTRACT
There are different conceptions of the relation between linguistic and nonlinguistic thought, and correspondingly of the scope and limits of nonlinguistic thought. These different conceptions fall naturally into two broad groups. At one extreme are views that seek to drive as much of a wedge as possible between linguistic and nonlinguistic thought. For example, there is the minimalist conception of nonlinguistic thought, according to which nonlinguistic creatures are capable only of an etiolated and imagistic type of thinking, the vehicles of which are “spatial images superimposed on spatial perceptions.” If the minimalist conception is correct then it will provide us with a very clear sense of the differences between linguistic thought and nonlinguistic thought. So too would a view that goes naturally with the minimalist conception – the view, namely, that considerations of sense and mode of presentation can get no grip in the absence of language. But much of my book Thinking without Words (from which this chapter is extracted) is devoted to arguing that, initial appearances to the contrary, there is indeed room at the nonlinguistic level for the ascription of thoughts that have determinate content and compositional structure – and, more strongly, that such thoughts are indispensable for the purpose of psychological explanation. So where does this leave us? Are there any genuine differences at all between linguistic thought and nonlinguistic thought?
