ABSTRACT
Chinese laid-off workers direct their action not only at their firms but also at the government, usually at the local level. Like their counterparts in other transitional economies, Chinese workers target the government because the government is directly involved in reforms or is believed to be able to address their problems. 1 Facing worker resistance, the Chinese government is not passive and has adopted several measures that have significantly abated resistance from workers, thereby making it possible to carry out reform while maintaining social stability. From 1995 to 1999, the number of industrial SOEs decreased by more than 48 percent, 2 which has inevitably increased layoffs and worker resistance. Yet, by the early 2000s, the Chinese government showed “scant signs of flinching from its programme of industrial reform.” 3 Reform measures like layoffs, privatization, and closure have been further extended to large SOEs. From the early 2000s, local governments began to stop establishing RSCs and required laid-off workers to terminate labor relations with their firms and to enter the labor market directly, although the many problems with workers’ welfare and reemployment as detailed in Chapter 2 remain. 4
