ABSTRACT
The American military delegation, appointed by Congress to report on the Art of War in Europe as a result of the Crimean War was impressed by the new potential for both coastal assault and defence. At least in terms of Sea-Coast and Harbor Defenses, it felt the US had less to learn from the Europeans than of any other part of the art of war. The vast bulk of the Royal Navy, some 43 battleships, with a specialised coastal assault flotilla of light-draught gun-boats, mortar vessels, fire ships and troop transports successfully concentrated in the West Indies, appearing before the ports combined yet grossly outnumbered defences in 1741. For in truth, coastal assault or power projection has always been a dangerous business even for the Mistress of the Seas. British intelligence was outdated, over-confident and unreliable. Enemy strength and moral resolve was grossly underestimated, an unwelcome side-effect of Porto Bello.
