ABSTRACT
The mid-1950s were influenced by a series of events that had occurred over previous years, but were only then making their impact evident. Some of those more major events included decolonisation by the European countries, the growth of Israel in the Middle East and the lasting clash with the Arab nations, the modernisation of China, and de-Stalinisation in the Soviet Union that produced new leaders and greater autonomy for satellites such as Poland. The short Suez War in October 1956 was a demonstration of the impact of those tensions in the context of the Middle East. American leaders observed the progress of these changes, particularly those giving advantage to the communists, such as the policies of the emerging Soviet bloc in providing economic assistance and loans to the new nations in the Far East and Asia. These developments encouraged the American leaders to be less inclined to reduce the embargo they imposed on China. This tougher US stance led the British Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, to write to Foster Dulles on 12 December 1955 saying that if the US did not agree to align the Soviet and China lists, the UK would unilaterally abandon the China differential. Dulles met Macmillan at the NATO meeting in mid-December, and asked him to defer action until after the Prime Minister met the President in Washington on 31 January 1956. At that White House meeting, President Eisenhower indicated that he wished to maintain the 'restrictions on trade with Communist China' so that the US would avoid being seen to be 'reducing the confidence of other states in the stability of United States policy'. However, he did accept a list of items which Prime Minister Eden proposed for de-control and he promised to have them examined by a number of expert committees working on the problem.i As will be seen, that review was to become a protracted matter.
