ABSTRACT
The assassination of the two main coup leaders and the disintegration of the cabinet they had brought about marked the end of Iraq's first coup government. The army, however, was to continue as an effective instrument of politics. The main reason the King called upon Jamil al-Madfa'i to form a government was that the latter enjoyed the support of army officers: namely, Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh, Mahmud Salman, Fahmi Sai'd, Kamil Shabib, 'Aziz Yamulki, Husain Fauzi and Amin al-'Umari – all known for their sympathy with pan-Arabism. It is reported that Jamil al-Madfa'i refused to form a government unless he received an undertaking from these officers that they would refrain from intervening in political affairs forthwith.1 Such an undertaking was granted, and Jamil al-Madfa'i followed this initial success by taking over the post of Minister of Defence himself, hoping thereby to shut off one possible source of rivalry and conflict. At the same time, anxious to let bygones be bygones, he successfully resisted demands on him to open an inquiry into the deaths of Ja'far al-'Askari and Bakir Sidqi and instead showed inclinations to let one murder cancel out the other.2 Furthermore, aware of the obvious need for maintaining the maximum degree of unity within the armed forces, he pledged not to punish those officers who had collaborated with Bakir Sidqi, and at the same time appointed the above-mentioned seven officers (The Seven') to eminent positions with the hope of silencing them.
