ABSTRACT
Readers of Austin's still influential Province of Jurisprudence Determined and of his now somewhat neglected Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law cannot fail to notice the marks of Bentham's powerful influence on the development of Austin's thought. In both these works Austin makes a number of respectful references 1 to Bentham, sometimes avowing his' habitual veneration' for him; and it is clear that he regarded Bentham as his master in jurisprudence, even though he quite frequently ventured not only to differ from but to criticize his master with some asperity.2 The truth is, however, that Bentham is not only Austin's master in the sense that Austin has learnt from him; he was also a far more profound and original thinker, and a much greater philosopher of law. Bentham's conception of analytical jurisprudence and his legal theory was richer, subtler and more sensitive to the variety and wayward complexities of legal phenomena than Austin's monolithic and easily teachable doctrine. Sometimes, as in his discussion of sovereignty, with which this article is concerned, Bentham's perception of the complexity of the subject made him not only less dogmatic in his conclusions than Austin, but perhaps also more obscure and less consistent. But the obscurities and inconsistencies of great minds are frequently more illuminating than the clarities and consistencies of lesser ones.
