The French consolation prizes implied no real diminution in the British hegemony. But France was now accepted more readily by Britain as a 'junior partner' in Africa,68 on the tacit condition that she refrain from further major advances on the African seaboard. The terms of the modus vivendi were well understood at Paris. In 1860 Napoleon III, who had no more wish than Guizot to quarrel with Britain in Africa, vetoed plans for large scale expansion on the Red Sea and Somali coasts for fear of a hostile British reaction; and the Anglo-French treaty of March 1862 guaranteeing the independence of Zanzibar was in fact if not in form a French undertaking not to disturb the status quo between Somalia and Mozambique.69 For some years after 1870 the precarious international situation of France made the Quai d'Orsay more than usually anxious not to arouse British ill-will by inconsiderate behaviour in Africa; hence the care taken to stifle local competition on the West Coast.70