Introduction

Throughout the half-century between the Crimean War and the outbreak of the First World War, few countries confronted successive British governments with the complexity of problems posed by the Ottoman Empire. The distinctive feature of Britain’s Ottoman policy during this period was one of gradual change: the attitude of friendliness, which was evident in the Crimean War and the Eastern Crisis of 1877–8, and which was associated with such eminent British statesmen as Palmerston, Stratford Canning and Disraeli, turned to coldness and occasional hostility, epitomized in the person of Gladstone. ¹ Enmity seemed to have reached its peak at Reval on the eve of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. But the uniqueness of Britain’s policy towards the Ottoman Empire does not lie solely in the gradual deterioration of relations, which is not an infrequent diplomatic occurrence. The significant factor was the bifurcate nature of Britain’s aims. Britain advocated that the Ottoman Empire be reformed from within, a clear case of foreign intervention in another country’s internal affairs; simultaneously, however, she claimed to defend its independence and integrity. As early as the Congress of Berlin, the pursuit of these two incompatible goals had demonstrably failed; nevertheless, it was not entirely abandoned. ² Indeed, British demands for Reform became shriller and, from the Ottoman point of view, increasingly unpalatable and self-defeating.