ABSTRACT
After the initial flurry of postwar Arab-Zionist negotiation attempts, the confirmation of the Mandate brought a halt to any further efforts to tackle any large political questions. Neither the Arabs nor the Zionists had it in their power to provide what the other was really after. The Palestinian Arabs’ campaign to subvert, or at least freeze, the implementation of the Jewish National Home policy confined itself to protests and pressure directed at the British authorities and the League of Nations Mandates Commission. For their part, the Zionists now concentrated their efforts on obtaining from the British a firm attitude toward any possible unrest, and a sympathetic approach to Zionist immigration, land-purchase and settlement. W ith the Arabs it now appeared sufficient for Zionists to have “ normal”, friendly day-to-day relations in an atmosphere of peace and prosperity, while touchy political issues would be best left to one side. The Arabs, too, found limited intercourse with the Jews tactically or materially useful.
