Breadcrumbs Section. Click here to navigate to respective pages.
Chapter
Chapter
limited to the desirable speed for attaining it and methods for doing so. Doubtless this was how it appeared at the outset to those involved. In retrospect, however, we can see that this distinction between ends and means is too simple. The reality is that ends and means rarely form a simple hierarchy or are easily separable. Means must be designed with the end in view; if the objective is not clearly perceived, then the design of policy will incorporate unforeseen distortions which may limit or even prevent attainment of the given goal. Means which turn out not to lead to the designated objective will have some other outcome instead. When ends and means prove incompatible it may suddenly transpire that the means are more precious than the original end, attainment of which is deferred or abandoned. Of course in many cases there will be several different routes to the same destination and, under these conditions, the choice of route will rest primarily on considerations of speed and economy of effort. But in other circumstances what is apparently a choice of means to an end will turn out to involve the choice of ends as well. Here different means incorporate different objectives and may be taken to stand for them; they become just as charged with value (or its opposite) as the goals to which they correspond. In theory Bolshevism was directed towards a classless society in which the state was to have 'withered away', coercion being replaced by voluntary association and co-operative creativity. Yet the circumstances of international and social conflict prompted the Soviet regime, from its first moments, to resolute measures of governmental and social coercion. These measures prompted deep divisions within Bolshevism. What was at issue was the appropriateness of such methods on grounds both of expediency (the regime's survival) and of principle (the regime's permanent objective of a socialist society). The question of expediency was settled in the sense that the regime survived. The question of principle remained unresolved. Was coercion a temporary expedient and the state no more than a necessary evil in the course of struggle for the realisation of human freedom? Or should Bolsheviks attach a positive value to their refinement and extension? And if coercive disciplines and authoritarian centralisation were to become the central themes of Bolshevik practice, what kind of society would result - a society capable of evolving towards the goals originally defined, or some more primitive and limited variant, or even a reversion to something completely antithetical to communist ideals? It was Bukharin who revealed most clearly the closeness of these issues to the debate over 'primary socialist accumulation'. He had broken with the left during the period of reassessment immediately following termination of the civil war, and became a leading exponent of the theory and practice of NEP as a possible road to socialism. He criticised both Preobrazhensky's concept of primary socialist accumulation and Stalin's subsequent attempt to secure a temporary 'tribute' from the peasantry - the former on the grounds that it would require widespread coercion to prevent peasant withdrawal from the market, losing the goodwill of the peasant masses without whom socialism could not be built in Russia; the latter because Stalin's policies for grain requisitioning initiated in the spring of 1928 amounted to 'military-feudal exploitation' of the village [e.g. Cohen, 1975:160- 73, 306- 7]. In neither case
DOI link for limited to the desirable speed for attaining it and methods for doing so. Doubtless this was how it appeared at the outset to those involved. In retrospect, however, we can see that this distinction between ends and means is too simple. The reality is that ends and means rarely form a simple hierarchy or are easily separable. Means must be designed with the end in view; if the objective is not clearly perceived, then the design of policy will incorporate unforeseen distortions which may limit or even prevent attainment of the given goal. Means which turn out not to lead to the designated objective will have some other outcome instead. When ends and means prove incompatible it may suddenly transpire that the means are more precious than the original end, attainment of which is deferred or abandoned. Of course in many cases there will be several different routes to the same destination and, under these conditions, the choice of route will rest primarily on considerations of speed and economy of effort. But in other circumstances what is apparently a choice of means to an end will turn out to involve the choice of ends as well. Here different means incorporate different objectives and may be taken to stand for them; they become just as charged with value (or its opposite) as the goals to which they correspond. In theory Bolshevism was directed towards a classless society in which the state was to have 'withered away', coercion being replaced by voluntary association and co-operative creativity. Yet the circumstances of international and social conflict prompted the Soviet regime, from its first moments, to resolute measures of governmental and social coercion. These measures prompted deep divisions within Bolshevism. What was at issue was the appropriateness of such methods on grounds both of expediency (the regime's survival) and of principle (the regime's permanent objective of a socialist society). The question of expediency was settled in the sense that the regime survived. The question of principle remained unresolved. Was coercion a temporary expedient and the state no more than a necessary evil in the course of struggle for the realisation of human freedom? Or should Bolsheviks attach a positive value to their refinement and extension? And if coercive disciplines and authoritarian centralisation were to become the central themes of Bolshevik practice, what kind of society would result - a society capable of evolving towards the goals originally defined, or some more primitive and limited variant, or even a reversion to something completely antithetical to communist ideals? It was Bukharin who revealed most clearly the closeness of these issues to the debate over 'primary socialist accumulation'. He had broken with the left during the period of reassessment immediately following termination of the civil war, and became a leading exponent of the theory and practice of NEP as a possible road to socialism. He criticised both Preobrazhensky's concept of primary socialist accumulation and Stalin's subsequent attempt to secure a temporary 'tribute' from the peasantry - the former on the grounds that it would require widespread coercion to prevent peasant withdrawal from the market, losing the goodwill of the peasant masses without whom socialism could not be built in Russia; the latter because Stalin's policies for grain requisitioning initiated in the spring of 1928 amounted to 'military-feudal exploitation' of the village [e.g. Cohen, 1975:160- 73, 306- 7]. In neither case
limited to the desirable speed for attaining it and methods for doing so. Doubtless this was how it appeared at the outset to those involved. In retrospect, however, we can see that this distinction between ends and means is too simple. The reality is that ends and means rarely form a simple hierarchy or are easily separable. Means must be designed with the end in view; if the objective is not clearly perceived, then the design of policy will incorporate unforeseen distortions which may limit or even prevent attainment of the given goal. Means which turn out not to lead to the designated objective will have some other outcome instead. When ends and means prove incompatible it may suddenly transpire that the means are more precious than the original end, attainment of which is deferred or abandoned. Of course in many cases there will be several different routes to the same destination and, under these conditions, the choice of route will rest primarily on considerations of speed and economy of effort. But in other circumstances what is apparently a choice of means to an end will turn out to involve the choice of ends as well. Here different means incorporate different objectives and may be taken to stand for them; they become just as charged with value (or its opposite) as the goals to which they correspond. In theory Bolshevism was directed towards a classless society in which the state was to have 'withered away', coercion being replaced by voluntary association and co-operative creativity. Yet the circumstances of international and social conflict prompted the Soviet regime, from its first moments, to resolute measures of governmental and social coercion. These measures prompted deep divisions within Bolshevism. What was at issue was the appropriateness of such methods on grounds both of expediency (the regime's survival) and of principle (the regime's permanent objective of a socialist society). The question of expediency was settled in the sense that the regime survived. The question of principle remained unresolved. Was coercion a temporary expedient and the state no more than a necessary evil in the course of struggle for the realisation of human freedom? Or should Bolsheviks attach a positive value to their refinement and extension? And if coercive disciplines and authoritarian centralisation were to become the central themes of Bolshevik practice, what kind of society would result - a society capable of evolving towards the goals originally defined, or some more primitive and limited variant, or even a reversion to something completely antithetical to communist ideals? It was Bukharin who revealed most clearly the closeness of these issues to the debate over 'primary socialist accumulation'. He had broken with the left during the period of reassessment immediately following termination of the civil war, and became a leading exponent of the theory and practice of NEP as a possible road to socialism. He criticised both Preobrazhensky's concept of primary socialist accumulation and Stalin's subsequent attempt to secure a temporary 'tribute' from the peasantry - the former on the grounds that it would require widespread coercion to prevent peasant withdrawal from the market, losing the goodwill of the peasant masses without whom socialism could not be built in Russia; the latter because Stalin's policies for grain requisitioning initiated in the spring of 1928 amounted to 'military-feudal exploitation' of the village [e.g. Cohen, 1975:160- 73, 306- 7]. In neither case
ABSTRACT
The Stalinist commitment to coercive methods of authoritarian management arose in the context of the huge gap between aspirations and realities. To the new generation of industrial and economic leaders in the late 1920s backward agrarian Russia appeared to lack all the prerequisites for a socialist society except one - the Soviet political system, which was in their hands. Administrative mobilisation of resources from above became the principal means for realising their grandiose dreams (although, we shall see, it could not be sustained indefinitely or remain their sole reliance). The organisers of Stalin's 'great breakthrough' had little interest in the interaction of plan and market, or the role of economic signals within an operationally decentralised public sector. They regarded the market as a seedbed of economic anarchy or, worse, of capitalist renaissance. Their model of a socialist economy was primarily one of physical resource allocation by decree [Carr and Davies, 1974: Chapter 32].