ABSTRACT
Count Folke Bernadotte was appointed the United Nations mediator on the Palestine question on 20 May 1948; Lehi first referred to the appointment on 1 June and its tone was a priori hostile.' In part, this was because of the obvious discrepancy in his aims and those of the movement; while Lehi dreamed of Jewish Legions parading through Amman, Bernadotte aimed at the restriction of the Jews to just a small portion of the west bank of the Jordan. More fundamentally, however, Lehi suspected Bernadotte's credentials. He was, after all, the emissary of the United Nations, an organisation which did not have the best interests of the Hebrew people at heart. That also made him an agent of Anglo-Saxon imperialism; as much was indicated by the proposed composition of his staff, which was to comprise American, French, Belgian and Swedish officers but not Poles, Romanians, Hungarians, Yugoslavs and Bulgarians. Hence, Bernadotte was the enemy of all those who - like Lehi - regarded a pro-Soviet policy as the only guarantee of Israel's survival. Because the Provisional Government obviously thought otherwise, its members were to be condemned. Shertok's agreement to a cease-fire during the course of secret negotiations with the mediator proved to Lehi that the government of Israel was set on the path of compromise and surrender. Hence the warning issued as early as 6 June:
Should the Government of Israel agree to Bernadotte's 'interpretation' with regard to immigration and supply to Jerusalem; should it agree to the composition of the team of observers as proposed by the Count with a pedigree; then it would indicate that the Government has sacrificed its independence even before becoming independent. It would have unconditionally surrendered to the Imperialist enemy. 2
Lehi's criticisms of all who collaborated with Bernadotte became increasingly strident during the next few days. Its attacks on the Provisional Government were particularly vicious. Ministers were accused of helping the Arab war effort by agreeing to the incarceration of Jewish immigrants of military age in 'concentration camps'; of violating Israel's own declaration of independence by being proAmerican instead on non-aligned; and of agreeing to the eventual
resuscitation of the Morrison-Grady Plan, whereby Eretz Israel would be divided between 'two Abdullahs, one Arab and the other Jewish', both of whom would owe allegiance to the same British master. Instead of seizing the glorious military opportunities now available, Ben-Gurion and his minions were simply succumbing to Bernadotte's dictates. In so doing, they were sharing his responsibility for the destruction of the Hebrew national entity. The proper course would have been to pronounce Israel's non-recognition of the UN's framework of supervisors, and to expel them. 3
Lehi claimed that the fact that the Provisional Government did not act thus merely revealed the extent to which its members still held to the same views as had characterised their behaviour during the period before the State of Israel existed. They failed to appreciate that Bernadotte's mission was not truly mediatory; his objective was to save the Arab states and to implement British plans. Hence, 'whoever accepts [Bernadotte's invitation) to a conference at Rhodes accepts another Munich; it is like going to Berchtesgaden'. Bernadotte was in fact making Bevin's work easier. In the not too distant past, the latter had needed tens of thousands of troops and millions of pounds sterling. Now, his mission was being accomplished by just a handful of officers. 4
Interwoven with some of these prognoses of doom were more explicit threats. Most were directed against the members of the Provisional Government. ('There is a limit to treachery and a border to discipline . . . the fighting youth will cast off the yoke of the discipline ofthe surrenderers.') 5 In addition, however, Lehi also cast its net wider. Together with the IZL, Lehi informed American correspondents that it would violate the cease-fire by murdering foreign observers.6
