ABSTRACT
After 1815, military leaders faced two problems: the need to absorb the experience of the Napoleonic wars and later in the century the necessity to repond to major new developments in the efficiency of weapons. These two problems produced a dichotomy in tactical thinking and practice. Concentration on Napoleonic methods created a new status quo. As Frederick's system dominated the late eighteenth century, Napoleon's became the norm for early nineteenth· century tactics. Officers studied, modified, and refined Imperial doctrine but saw no need to introduce fundamental changes. Improved weapons, on the other hand, compelled changes. Firearms attained greater range, accuracy, and rate of fire. Increased firepower ultimately spelled the end of close order combat formations and made light infantry tactics the sole effective battle order. Thus, the tactics developed in the decades after Waterloo were a product of diverse attitudes: the desire to adapt previous experience to present circumstances and the necessity to respond to conditions created by the introduction of new and improved weapons.
