ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION In March 1985, three years after the publication of the first American operational field manual, one of the more active members of the group of military reformers used the following words in reference to the mental transformation which the American army underwent in the early 1980s:
For all practical purposes, the study of operations ended in the US Anny after World War II. Perhaps the belief that nuclear weapons meant the end of conventional land warfare was to blame, but whatever the cause, the knowledge of large units operations declined continually even with the object lesson of Korea before us. Three years ago the Anny substantially revised its doctrine. FM 100-5, Operations, contained some significant changes and a few of these, chiefly deep attack and manoeuvre-based tactics, stimulated a great deal of debate. Yet a less noted change, the addition of the operational level of war as a separate field of military activity, has generated relatively little discussion although it certainly represents a distinct departure from the familiar. In fact, the adoption of operational art may be the most important change in Anny doctrine since World War II. The Anny's response to it may determine the force's success in the next war.l
Western counterparts, but also the heavy impact of Soviet perceptions on each of the American theoretical advances. Thus, almost naturally the question arises: What innovations has the recent American conceptual endeavour contributed to the universal field of operational thought?
