ABSTRACT
When its Sixth Offensive (as Tito and the Partisans called it) faltered during the winter of 1943–44, the German High Command began to realise that it was losing the initiative in Jugoslavia. Tito, his staff and large bodies of Partisans had repeatedly escaped from every trap that had been laid, and all efforts to destroy them had come to nothing. Increasing Anglo-American pressure in Italy (the assault on Cassino and the Gustav Line began on 11 May; Rome fell on 4 June) and the Russian advances further north were making it necessary to withdraw divisions from the Balkans: two had gone to Italy in the early spring and four more had been sent to occupy Hungary in March. Since further attempts to annihilate the Partisans by large-scale attacks were clearly out of the question, an alternative plan was devised: a bold stroke at its centre might paralyse the Partisan leadership, thus restoring the initiative to the Germans, and might even kill or capture Tito and his staff as well.
