ABSTRACT
As bombing operations commenced, however, Trenchard reversed course and wanted more independence. He had complained about having to handle administrative duties, but when the Air Ministry sent more staff he argued that they were a waste of manpower and did not help to add a single mission to his bombing effort. He objected to Air Ministry interference and complained that publicity for the I A F should not only be promoted to enhance the moral effect of the bombing but that it should not be linked to Air Ministry operations at all.17 Trenchard was never satisfied. He had argued repeatedly that his force was insufficient to do little more than pin-prick bombing and most of his correspondence with Weir consisted of complaints about lack of support . By the end of July, however, Trenchard told Weir that he could not possibly handle Sykes' proposed 104 squadrons, at which point Weir reduced the number to 54.18
Trenchard was correct that the I A F organization was premature - Britain did not have a capable bomber force, either in terms of carrying and delivery capacity or in numbers of aircraft. Yet Sykes accurately assessed that the costly air strategy Trenchard had pursued for two years would never allow such a bomber force to come into existence.19 It was time for new thinking.20 Home defense was not the solution; the best defense was a counteroffense.21 Sykes had to start somewhere, and based on the premise that the war would last until au tumn 1919, the initiating of an independent force in summer 1918 was logical.
