ABSTRACT
The problem initially examined here, entailed by the two sides' perceptions and views of UN peacemaking in Cyprus, has expanded into several other problem areas. It has led into an examination of the legal position of both sides, the effects of power asymmetries on peacemaking, and the relationship between UN peacekeeping and peacemaking. This has enabled a demonstration of the interdependence of the several factors of a UN peacemaking operation, and how it has been mistaken to concentrate on certain aspects while tending to ignore others. These factors are: the disputants; their supporters and opponents; the conflict environment; a peacekeeping force; the mediator; the mediation process; the disputants' views of the mediator; the objectives of the parties with respect to the mediator and the process; the complex negotiations which give rise the mediator's mandate and mission; the disputants' and mediator's constituencies; contributors, and their constituencies. Through this examination of the two sides' views, I have concluded that my work has, like that of others working in the field of IR, touched on a fundamental issue: conflict is subjective and the ending of conflict through the disputants' eyes tends to be seen as a zero-sum game even if they are committed to negotiation and compromise. While the underlying focus of the UN-sponsored talks since 1964 has been to improve the lot of the two Cypriot communities and to produce a stable situation, the language of the negotiations has revolved around the issues of security related to statehood and sovereignty. This tended to obscure the needs of the individuals who have been directly affected by the conflict and has led the disputants into constant deadlock; thus devious objectives on their part have emerged. It must also be asked whether the international community and even the UN peacemaking operation were themselves guided by the belief that the current position was at least tried and tested. Thus they were unwilling to put pressure on the parties to agree to a new solution which
had not emerged from the framework of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiations. As the post-1974 status quo has broken down, the international community has been galvanized into action and seems now to be moving away from its relatively passive involvement in peacemaking, as seen particularly from 1964 to the end of the Cold War. This tends to indicate that in the Cyprus case even the third party was not motivated by an underlying assumption that a compromise should emerge from the process of mediation and peacemaking, but that what was important was the continuation of the talks, hence the reluctance of the UN to point the finger of blame at any party that may have been responsible for the breakdown of any particular round or to exert pressure for a solution. Thus the continuation of the process, moving from one inconclusive round of talks to the next, clearly fulfilled the requirement of keeping the situation calm through the establishment of a negotiation culture. This may have become a secondary aim of the UN mission in Cyprus; but this also allowed the disputants to develop their own strategies within the mediation process that were aimed at their own objectives.
