ABSTRACT
Germany's defeat in the First World War, the limitations imposed on her armaments by the Treaty of Versailles, and the creation of the League of Nations to arbitrate on future disputes between the great powers all heralded an era of collective security and disarmament. Despite the Locarno Treaty of 1925, however, which appeared to put German-French relations on a more amicable footing, those responsible for French security remained alert to the possible recurrence of a threat from the east. The invasions of 1870 and 1914 left France deeply insecure. The fearful loss of life among males under 35 in 1914-18 was a particularly severe blow to an already-ageing French population. The demographic crisis spurred new ways of thinking about how to provide the nation with defensive military security after 1919. Protecting French territorial integrity in future by means of permanent defences, rather than by expending the lives of another generation of young French soldiers, acquired a compelling psychological and electoral logic for military leaders and politicians. Hence France plumped for the fortification of its eastern frontier, an idea seriously explored from 1922 onwards and literally set in concrete with the decision by the war minister, Andre Maginot, to commence construction in 1929.1
As far as their hopes of Britain were concerned, French statesmen and strategists were swiftly discouraged. As J. F. V. Keiger discusses in this volume, even highly-experienced French prime ministers such as Georges Clemenceau and Raymond Poincaré were unable to hold Britain to a continuing commitment to provide for the future defence of France. As a by-product of this growing diplomatic estrangement, military staff talks and joint contingency planning ceased. Indeed, the absence of any standing joint military committee among the signatories to Locarno – however
understandable – was recognized by all participants as seriously undermining the treaty as a meaningful instrument of security.
