ABSTRACT
I N DECEMBER 1812 it was clear that Napoleon had suffered a shattering defeat in Russia, but it was by no means clear either that this defeat would prove decisive, or that a new European coalition was about to be formed. Napoleon's military potential was still huge: he controlled most of Germany, including the Confederation of the Rhine and parts of Prussia; Poland; Italy, Illyria and Naples; the Low Countries and Denmark; Switzerland; and half of Spain. He was nominally allied with Prussia and Austria, his arch-enemies the British were now at war in America as well as Spain, and he controlled the mountain barriers of the Pyrenees and the Alps as well as the fortresses on most of Europe's major river lines. This great span of command certainly gave him the ability to raise new armies to replace the horrific losses of 1812 while his enemies were still far from united. Over the coming year it must have seemed as if the 6th Coalition came into being, if not by chance, at least by a gradual process of accumulation which was accelerated by public opinion and military events.
