ABSTRACT
A LTHOUGH HE HAD the benefit of hindsight, Clausewitz's description of Napoleon's frenetic period of activity is remarkably apt. In the aftermath of Grossbeeren, Ku1m and the Katzbach, the Emperor conducted a thorough-going review of his operational plan and the courses open. These courses he reduced to two. First, he could block the allies in the north and east and concentrate the bulk of his army for a march south in order to destroy the Army of Bohemia and seize Prague. Second, he could block to the east and south while directing the bulk of his forces against the Army of the North and Berlin. His deliberations seem to show that he was prejudiced in favour of attacking northwards, for this course offered the chance of returning to the original campaign plan with the bonus of dealing a hard blow against Bernadotte. It also offered new sources of forage, which was becoming scarce in the south. Last, but perhaps most important, it offered the advantages of a central position.
