ABSTRACT
The subject matter of this chapter relates closely to that of the previous two. In chapter 4, I argued that there was no necessary connection between legal obligation and any moral obligation to meet our legal obligations, and that as a matter of empirical fact, sanctions for breach of legal obligations were overwhelmingly likely to be necessary to achieve the functions aimed at by most legal systems, even if not for each individual legal norm. Given this practical importance of penal sanctions and the threat of them as a cornerstone for most criminal justice systems, at least in the sorts of societies which are our focus, and given the thesis of the separation of legal and moral obligation, it is clearly important, if we are to produce a justification of punishment, to give an account of political obligation: how do the arguments which justify punishment relate to the reasons why citizens ought to obey the criminal law? If political obligation cannot be explained and defended, where does this leave the enterprise of justifying punishment? If we have no obligation to obey the law, can we justifiably be punished for breaking it?
