ABSTRACT
The higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness asserts that a mental state is conscious if it is the object of a thought about it. Given that we have some naturalistically acceptable understanding of thoughts independent of the problem of consciousness, HOT theory promises a mentalistic reduction of consciousness. Then, the naturalistic account of non-conscious mind – which is presumably relatively easy to attain – solves the whole mind-body problem. HOT theory makes substantial assumptions . It assumes that the mind’s contents divide into the intentional (or representational) and the non-intentional (qualia, sensations). It assumes that consciousness requires conceptual thought, and what is more, requires apparently pretty sophisticated concepts about mental states as such. It assumes that no mental state is essentially a conscious state. It comes dangerously close to assuming that consciousness is always and only of mental states. Not all these assumptions are plausible, and they lead to many objections (e.g. can animals, to whom the ability to engage in conceptual thought may be doubted, be conscious; what is an unconscious pain, etc.). Some objections can be deflected, but problems remain that engage the generation problem and prevent the mentalistic reduction from going through successfully.
