ABSTRACT
Khrushchev was overthrown by an alliance of interests threatened by his erratic behaviour and populist impulses. By contrast, the Brezhnev years were marked by a stability which imperceptibly degenerated into stagnation. An unprecedented degree of security of tenure for office-holders was established, known as the policy of ‘stability of cadres’, whereby an increasingly stable elite could enjoy the fruits of office. The new leadership consolidated a pattern of post-Stalinist politics developed by Khrushchev but shorn of his populism. Khrushchev’s rule had been stamped by bold policy initiatives and institutional innovation, whereas Brezhnev’s rule was characterised by a timidity and conservatism that evolved into a prolonged period of drift and the accumulation of problems. His two successors, Andropov and Chernenko, lacked the time to consolidate their positions, and it was left to Gorbachev to overcome the inertia by injecting into the system leadership dynamism, a renewal of the elite, a flurry of policy initiatives and increasingly radical institutional change. While stagnation might have been dangerous for the system, radical reform proved fatal.
