ABSTRACT
Appearances, however, can be deceptive. Thatcher was a more cautious, and certainly more temporising, world leader than the strident image implies. She also developed a perceptive understanding of what was achievable. When she came to power, she wanted a resolution of the long-running dispute over the independence of Southern Rhodesia. The country had since 1965 been governed by white colonials led by Ian Smith in what the FO prissily told the BBC to refer to as ‘the illegal Smith regime’. Among the nationalist leaders queuing to take over when negotiations brought ‘majority rule’, Thatcher favoured Abel Muzorewa, a moderate black bishop she trusted, over Robert Mugabe, a black Marxist she did not. Additionally, Muzorewa had been the only senior black politician to stand in an election arranged by the Smith government in April 1979. Mugabe, who had been leading a civil war against Smith, had boycotted the elections. Lord Carrington was able to persuade Thatcher that endorsing
Muzorewa would be interpreted internationally as ‘a device to perpetuate the white man’s rule behind an amenable and unrepresentative
black front’.2 Thatcher acknowledged that ‘unpleasant realities had to be faced’. She opted for all-party talks in London. From these, a peaceful transition to majority rule ensued and Mugabe became newly independent Zimbabwe’s democratically elected leader. Against the steely image, the prime minister understood the need for compromise on a sensitive human-rights issue. She had informed the House of Commons in March 1980 that the government would accept the outcome of what she called ‘free and fair elections’.3 Having won a decisive victory, Mugabe was invited to make an official visit to the UK in 1982. Thatcher congratulated Zimbabwe on effecting ‘reconstruction and rehabilitation … at remarkable speed’. She looked forward to increasing British investment there. Mugabe meanwhile was congratulated for his tireless efforts ‘to consolidate the independence of his country and improve the quality of life of his people’.4 Such tributes to an ideologically offensive and, as things turned out, increasingly profligate and idiosyncratic ruler evidently came within the parameters of ‘unpleasant realities’. Unlike the Queen, Thatcher was never a great admirer of the Com-
monwealth, not really seeing what such a polyglot organisation was for. She also felt that it contained too many uncouth leaders and too many uncongenial and ideologically unsound regimes. Nevertheless, she knew that settling the Rhodesia issue would smooth Commonwealth relations at the beginning of her term of office. It would also win international approval. Her summary was characteristically crisp and simple. It also demonstrates why the raging internal struggle between practical politician and ideologue was almost invariably won by the former:
It was sad that Rhodesia/Zimbabwe finished up with a Marxist government in a continent where there were too many Marxists maladministering their countries’ resources. But political and military realities were all too evidently on the side of the guerilla leaders.5
