ABSTRACT
Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote two books: the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations. According to Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and indeed most philosophers of language, including the younger Wittgenstein, reference or naming is fundamental. Wittgenstein famously compared language to a toolbox, and words for tools. S. Kripke's own solution, presented on behalf of Wittgenstein, has won a fair following, but many others have been proposed. At Section 243 of the Investigations Wittgenstein introduces the idea of a language in which words stand for inner experiences, things that can only be known to the person speaking. When Investigations first came out, many readers supposed that the impossibility of private language implied that sensations are necessarily public – or that Wittgenstein was arguing for behaviourism. Wittgenstein proposes a quite different way of thinking about language from Frege's, or Russell's, or his own former self's.
