ABSTRACT
In the last chapter, we saw Kant's detailed empirical anthropology. While this anthropology does not rise to the level of a “science” in Kant's strict sense, it is a highly systematic account of universal human characteristics. This chapter looks at two further and related aspects of Kant's empirical account of human beings that flesh out Kant's empirical anthropology and complete unfinished business left by the Critique of Judgment regarding what we may hope for humanity (see 11: 429). First, we look at Kant's account of human evil. For Kant, human beings are “radically” evil “by nature.” Despite this apparently glum assessment, however, Kant endorses a realistic hope for human goodness. Second, we look at one component of this hope, Kant's philosophy of human history, beginning with the emergence of human beings as a new kind of animal with a rational nature and progressing toward a future of perpetual peace amongst nations and increasingly cosmopolitan political, ethical, and social lives.
