ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the East China Sea disputes between China and Japan, including unsettled maritime demarcations and the Diaoyu (in Chinese)/Senkaku (in Japanese) territorial sovereignty. Applying both rational choice approaches and prospect theory, we introduce two integrated models, the power-possession model and the political legitimacy-prospect model to explain both rational and irrational policies of Japan and China toward the East China Sea disputes. Based on the power transition theory in international relations, our power-possession model specifies that the general trajectories of China’s and Japan’s policies toward the East China Sea disputes are determined by the interplay of the power status of the two states and the possession status of the disputed territories. Built on prospect theory, our political legitimacy-prospect model accounts for the irrational or risky behavior of China and Japan in the East China Sea disputes. We suggest that leaders are more likely to take risks either to compromise or to provoke when they are framed in a domain of losses, i.e., when their political legitimacy is seriously challenged. The analysis in this chapter indicates that prospect theory and rationalist approaches are not competitive in nature, but complementary in enriching our understanding of international politics.
