Introduction

Over a single week in late 2007, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, authorized the establishment of a High Court, issued by-laws for his 2006 succession edict that named its permanent members, and ordered his foreign minister to take necessary steps to counter the rise of the kingdom's regional hegemonic foe. ‘Abdallah affirmed his will to power, husbanded new reforms that aimed to refurbish vital institutions, and strengthened the Al Sa‘ud ruling family. ¹ Though critics dismissed these measures as cosmetic steps that failed to introduce genuine reforms in the Sa‘udi body politic, the monarch's initiatives were anything but superficial, as painstakingly explained by the patient ruler. To be sure, while every sovereign articulates a “will to power,” Riyadh perceived its various political and religious institutions as the vehicles for the kingdom's raison d'état, which first emerged in 1932 under ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdul Rahman — erroneously referred to Ibn Sa‘ud — and was honed into an art form by Faysal bin Abdul ‘Aziz. Although the founder articulated a “Sa‘udi” identity, this will to power was severely tested under Faysal, who confronted an ideological challenge from Egypt and family members who objected to his austerity measures. ² Successive rulers secured the survival of the regime, linked the latter to order, and ensured the triumph of Al Sa‘ud ideology. Faysal sharpened the parameters through which ideology was understood, and envisaged a logically constructed view of social and political life containing elements of myth and symbolism, which were used to communicate his message in simplified form. For him, as for ‘Abdallah in 2012, ideology was a lens through which the world was viewed to develop positive judgments that could be relied upon to form subjective assessments. ‘Abdallah thus identified what he considered to be deleterious behavior, recognized values and outcomes worth striving for, and adopted normative parameters to help him govern effectively. His “will to power” was the sum total of his assessments, as well as the proper allocation of resources throughout the social strata, to enhance rulership and authority and, by implication, to guarantee the regime's legitimacy. ³ How well Abdallah managed his manifold domestic concerns, and successfully moved political markers, illustrated his preoccupations as they revealed the many internal challenges facing Riyadh. ⁴