ABSTRACT
Although the Sa‘udi-American alliance was literally etched in the stone of the Ghawar oil fields developed by American companies, it came under tremendous pressure in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, as well as the thwarted attack that ended in a remote field in Pennsylvania. The kingdom, where fifteen of the nineteen alleged terrorists hailed from, was suspected of collusion, perhaps even conspiracy. In fact, senior Al Sa‘ud officials failed to protect their own interests, when several advanced incredulous theories that pleaded innocence. Irrespective of what actually occurred, which was still murky as of this writing, Sa‘udi Arabia lost a full two years arguing back and forth on minutiae, instead of focusing on the fundamentals. After the May 12, 2003 terrorist assaults in Sa‘udi Arabia, however, the kingdom embarked on a widespread reappraisal of its responses, judged by Washington and others to have been mild in the past. Indeed, and beyond facile references to al-Qa‘idah, there was a genuine homegrown threat in the kingdom, given the number of disaffected young men who were mostly idle. In the event, the May 2003 attacks solicited measured responses, which were nothing short of phenomenal. Not only were terrorists targeted in unison, but Riyadh also rounded up several thousand clerics for re-education programs, hoping to address this intrinsic challenge by focusing on religious teachers that may have — even if inadvertently — prepped putative Islamists to resort to violence. To be sure, while Washington lost its global compass after 9/11, perceiving everything through the terrorism prism, Riyadh was equally motivated to launch massive campaigns after 5/12. Remarkably, 5/12 gained notoriety in Sa‘udi Arabia, nearly similar to 9/11 in the US, even if the casualties were far less. It was worth noting in this context that, parallel to this gigantic and unprecedented initiative to go after potential “terrorists” with gusto, the Sa‘udi government created a brand new force to protect the Abqai’q oil facility, entrusting it to loyal Al Murrah tribesmen. One also noted the progress made by Deputy Interior Minister Muhammad bin Nayif, as he funded rehabilitation programs to salvage as many of the kingdom's Islamists as possible.
