ABSTRACT
The metaphysical road we have chosen and travelled with Descartes was clearly and distinctly conceived. We sought to achieve scientia, that is, to establish the foundations of metaphysics and thereby physics, but along with Descartes we were unable to do so. Hyperbolic doubt is brought into the inquiry in order to sustain scepticism concerning the methods and disputations of Scholasticism, the appeal to theological authority and dogma as an instrument of knowledge and truth, and the reliance on unexamined principles. That is, hyperbolic doubt is brought in to clear all that, and to enable reason to assert its authority and freedom to demonstrate its autonomy in order to grapple with some of the most demanding problems of metaphysics. It seems impossible to overcome it, however, using only finite reason. Given the failure of the arguments for the existence of an infinite reason capable of defeating such a metaphysical doubt, what are the implications for Descartes' metaphysical quest, and for we who are no longer building such metaphysical bridges?
