ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the history of the ticking bomb hypothetical and its use by judges, politicians and scholars from a consequentialist perspective. It shows that the ticking bomb argument is uncertain in theory and practice. The self-evident part of the ticking bomb argument that requires state authorities to detain a person with the knowledge that could lead to the prevention of an imminent terrorist attack. Bufacchi and Arrigo argue that the ticking-bomb argument is so hyperbolical to have more affinities with science fiction than political science and the members of the judiciary found that the ticking bomb hypothetical is useful to illustrate. The chapter discusses four components that are commonly cited as being part of the hypothetical: imminence, intelligence, nature of the imminent threat and identifying those who would be subject to torture. The chapter finally argues that the hypothetical is used in some contexts does not offer a sound basis upon which to base sound counter-terrorism law making.
