ABSTRACT
Now that the basic concept of a reasonable person has been defined, we can better understand the problem Political Liberalism addresses. The overarching aim of Political Liberalism is to show how it is realistically possible for reasonable democratic citizens to agree upon and endorse for moral reasons a liberal conception of justice that assigns priority to the basic liberties of free and equal citizens and provides a reasonable social minimum. This may not seem to be a difficult problem since Rawls defines “reasonable persons” as those who want to cooperate with other reasonable persons on terms acceptable to them; it may seem that toleration of others’ ways of life required by the basic liberties is built into this definition. But Rawls’s definition of “reasonable persons” does not necessarily imply their acceptance of equal political liberties nor of fair equal opportunities or a social minimum. Moreover, even tolerance of others’ alternative beliefs and ways of life can be a challenge, since free and equal persons have conflicting moral, philosophical, and religious views. We often tolerate others for self-interested reasons, simply to avoid unnecessary conflict and strife. But why tolerate for moral reasons – because we believe it is morally right – someone who rejects our most deeply held moral and religious beliefs? Even if we want to cooperate on terms others can accept, toleration for moral reasons of others’ speech and ways of life we find morally and religiously repugnant can seem to be a peculiar position.1
