ABSTRACT
Kennedy’s questions, which did so much to impress Brandt and Bahr, mostly concerned Berlin, and Berlin, of course, was at the heart of Brandt’s conversations in Washington. Prior to the visit, Brandt’s administration had produced a detailed memorandum on technical improvements in Berlin for the Allies, but it came without any suggestions on how to proceed – in accordance with the line Brandt was to take in Washington, Berlin was not yet ready for a policy initiative.2 Neither was Washington, where Kennedy and Rusk explained to Brandt why not much was to be heard about Berlin in spring 1961. The only exception had been Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman, who had told Brandt and the Berliners on 8 March that the new administration did not consider itself bound by previous negotiations with Moscow: ‘the discussions should start from the beginning’. This seemed to do away with the concessions deliberated at Geneva and Paris, which came as a relief to Brandt, who had opposed them at the time and now eagerly seized the point that they had been withdrawn. However, the Harriman statement was ambiguous: ‘in opening up new areas for discussion it could also presage a softer line’.3 That in turn was, as his briefing materials told Kennedy, not what the Mayor wanted: Brandt still insisted that negotiations on Berlin should only be held in the context of negotiations over reunification. The same brief, however, also pointed out that Brandt might not get what he wanted
– but Brandt did not know of this and promptly advised Kennedy to ‘broaden the agenda’ if the Soviets were to raise the Berlin question once more.4
