It is accepted axiomatically within the US policy community that deterrence principles do not apply directly to terrorists. This logic was articulated forcefully in the President’s 2002 National Security Strategy statement when it asserted that “traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness” (Bush 2002a: 15). This assumption is not necessarily wrong. After all, terrorists live and thrive in the shadows of society without a fixed base of operations that governments can target; they do not control industries and cities that can be placed at risk through threats of punishment; they are by nature committed to changing the status quo and undermining deterrence; and they obtain legitimacy and derive strength only to the extent that they are successful in obtaining that objective. These are reasons, however, to believe that terrorists are not easily punished. In point of fact (as argued in Chapter 2), terrorists can be punished if only when they are denied their capabilities to conduct operations.