ABSTRACT
Assessing the willingness and ability of non-state actors to use BW is difficult, largely because there have been very few confirmed cases of groups or individuals acquiring or employing biological agents. Faced with the uncertainty associated with a paucity of empirical data on non-state use of BW, many policy-makers tend to err on the side of regarding the threat potential as high. They seek to hedge against the possibility of someone exploiting the full catastrophic potential of BW. In particular, policy discussions of ‘terrorism’ are often characterized by a pessimistic outlook formed by a belief that nightmarish hypothetical scenarios will become a reality. But assuming the worst, while analytically and politically convenient, is an expensive and possibly counterproductive way to approach the problem of biological attacks by non-state actors. In the interests of accurate threat assessment and appropriate resource allocation, it is incumbent on policy-makers and scholars alike to go beyond canvassing all the ghastly possibilities of ‘bioterrorism’. Stepping away from strict pessimism, it is important to explore why particular individuals or groups would not and/or could not carry out a mass-casualty biological attack. This in turn facilitates greater appreciation of how to address the prospect of small-scale BW use – the most likely scenario when contemplating non-state perpetrators.
