ABSTRACT
This chapter assesses responses to the problem of BW that have been or could be applied in East Asia. These generally fall into four categories: military, intelligence, legal and medical. Military responses include tactical response units, deterrence of BW-use by threat of nuclear attack and the recentlydevised Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). As a case study of intelligence challenges, this chapter focuses on the controversy surrounding the 2003 USled invasion of Iraq. For both military and intelligence responses, the technical nature of BW generates considerable difficulties for those seeking to locate, assess and respond to a BW threat. Most importantly, assembling evidence of an offensive BW programme is complicated by the so-called ‘dual use’ problem – that is, elements of such a programme can also be employed for legitimate, peaceful purposes such as defensive military research and commercial vaccine production. Legal responses to the BW problem, at the domestic or international level, are generally framed in the context of the BWC. The nature of the weapons this treaty bans is such that the BWC is a creature vastly different from other disarmament treaties. Monitoring member-state compliance is more difficult than is the case regarding legal controls on nuclear and chemical materials. In addition, there is scope under the BWC to address other disease-based security challenges beyond the traditional arms-control paradigm. Of great significance to dealing with BW and other infectious disease threats via the BWC is the vexed issue of balancing non-proliferation in the interests of security against the need for biotechnology transfers to support human health and economic development.
