ABSTRACT
Broadly speaking there are two views on the question of the moral basis for welfare
provision. One is that welfare is a matter of charity, generosity, humanity; of giving, but
not of strict obligation. The corollary of this view is that the recipients have no moral
right to what they receive because no individual person can have a right to another
person’s charity. The other view is that welfare provision is a matter of strict obligation
for those who hold resources and that those who are in need have strict moral claims on
those better off in society. Their needs create a right to welfare and a duty on the part of
the better endowed to grant welfare benefits to meet such needs. However, as we shall see, in this second case there is considerable disagreement about how this putative
obligation is to be analysed, whether in terms of rights, justice or needs-but in each case
the upshot is much the same: that people have a moral right to welfare provision. Each of
these views ultimately embodies a vision of human society and human morality, and the
discussion and evaluation of these different conceptions of the normative basis of welfare
provision raises some of the deepest questions about the nature of human society and
moral obligations.
