ABSTRACT
The foregoing discussion provides a useful set of parameters for thinking about needs. It
seems, in the light of the arguments advanced in the previous chapters, that it is false to
suggest that there are no states of the person that could be called basic or human needs
and to suggest that all needs are entirely morally relative and the products of a particular
moral code. In addition, we can infer from our account of basic needs that there is a
general obligation to provide resources to meet needs. However, it is still true to say that
there is considerable room for doubt and dispute over what will in fact satisfy the basic
needs for survival and autonomy. Frequently this will be an empirical issue to be settled
between individuals whose moral outlook is the same, but it would be dangerous to
assume that even within a given society moral and political values held by different
groups and individuals are likely to be in agreement over what is going to be an adequate
standard of satisfaction of basic need. Indeed, most of the political disputes about the
provision of welfare are likely to be disputes of this kind, and the pressing of a particular
view about the interpretation of need satisfaction raises issues about power in society and
how different welfare policies for the provision of need are put on to the political agenda.
This is so for the following reason. There must be a relationship between basic needs and
interests; while it may be true that a person’s interests are linked with his opportunities to
get what he wants and therefore may vary widely, just because wants may vary, it must
