The most central feature of mind, the ‘phenomenon’ that seems more than any other to be quintessentially ‘mental’ and nonphysical, is consciousness. In the chapters to follow, consciousness will be analysed from both the personal and sub-personal points of view, and the major advantage to be gained from paying attention to possible sub-personal accounts of consciousness will be that it will allow us to see that consciousness is not one feature or phenomenon or aspect of mind, but several. Once the term ‘consciousness’ is seen to allude to an incompatible congeries of features, and these features are sorted out and described, many of the most stubborn perplexities in philosophy of mind dissolve. The quest for a plausible and consistent analysis of consciousness develops into the hunting down of that elusive quarry, the little man in the brain, who is driven first from his role as introspector only to reappear as perceiver, reasoner, intender and knower. Since Ryle’s Concept of Mind, we all scoff at the notion of this little man, but scoffing is not enough.