ABSTRACT
The RMN is a service under strain. While it has developed an increasingly comprehensive view of its roles, it has long struggled with a mismatch between resources and tasking. The Navy has sought to combine sub-surface, surface and helicopter forces into a force structure designed for its maritime environment but, presence and surveillance being the priority, the RMN had to accept for many years that a sub-surface capability was outside its capacity. A long-standing conflict between the Navy’s war fighting role and the need to patrol a large EEZ ended, at least theoretically, with the late 2005 establishment of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), but the RMN still finds itself allocating warships to security tasks. However, with the perception of a much-reduced threat ‘down the Malay peninsula’, but continuing tensions on other borders, Malaysian defence planning is slowly acquiring a maritime focus and the submarine deficiency has recently been remedied, with the purchase of two units from France. This is only a start and the RMN will have to manage in a way that permits sustained development, rather than the fitful expansions evident in the past
