ABSTRACT
In the previous two chapters the competing positions of universalism and cultural relativism have each been discussed. Both influence debates in professional ethics. Yet if taken simply as mutually exclusive stances, it may appear as if what ought to follow is either to join the battle on one side or the other, or to stand back and observe the arguments as an interested bystander in describing them and commenting on their contributions to thinking about ethics. However, these are not the only choices. A third possibility is opened up by considering that the claims established by both universalism and cultural relativism require attention, but without any one position trumping all others. This approach is called ‘pluralism’ (sometimes ‘value pluralism’ or ‘ethical pluralism’) (Berlin, 1969, 1992; Kekes, 1993; Hinman, 2008). Pluralism can be summarized as the position that argues morality cannot be seen as ‘singular’ or ‘unitary’ but that ‘[t]here are many truths that are sometimes partial and sometimes conflicting’ (Hinman, 2008, p. 49).
