The functionings-based approach versus traditional welfare economics The most obvious of the differences between these two approaches is the way in which they interpret individual well-being. In particular, according to Alkire (2002: 5),

Sen argues that functionings – that is, ‘the various things a person may value doing or being’ – taken together create a better conceptual space in which to assess social welfare than utility or opulence. Functionings are ‘beings and doings’, such as being nourished, being confident, or taking part in group decisions. The word is of Aristotelian origin and, like Aristotle, Sen claims, significantly, that ‘functionings are constitutive of a person’s being’. So when [say] Oxfam undertakes to evaluate an individual’s or group of persons’ well-being (in the course, perhaps, of assessing their quality of life, standard of living, social welfare, or level of poverty), Sen would argue that it must have in view their functionings. How did the ‘beings and doings’ – expand and contract?