104 was, however, too much to expect of them to view things in 1921 with eyes of 1935. At that time, it must have appeared unthinkable that they should go out of their way to inflate deliberately in the United States or, at any rate, to allow the natural trend towards expansion to take its course, merely in order to obviate the necessity for Europe to deflate, or to facilitate the task of their debtors to pay their debt. The development of such an international conception of monetary policy could only be achieved at the cost of bitter experience. The United States, like other countries, had to learn at its own expense that a monetary policy guided exclusively by narrow national considerations was bound to recoil upon the nation itself. With the knowledge we possess to-day, it is evident that it would have been to the interest of the United States to inflate and to devalue the dollar after the war instead of deflating and thus forcing the world into a deflation which eventually inflicted a grave economic crisis upon the United States.