ABSTRACT

By the summer of 1953, France faced more than a decline in political support for the war. After seven years of bloodshed, it had become obvious to many observers that the French Army could not defeat the Vietminh. On 19 July, at 8:00 A.M., an electronically detonated mine destroyed a truck traveling between Hanoi and Haiphong on RC-5, the major highway that served as a lifeline between the northern capital and its port. This was the first such attack since 1948. 1 The insurgency in the north appeared to be spiraling out of control. Moreover, the armistice in Korea freed Chinese resources which, the French government feared, might find their way into Vietnam and Laos. Given France’s failure to pacify Indochina, the Laniel government felt compelled to initiate negotiations with China and the Vietminh. This had been impossible during the Korean War, when the western allies pledged not to negotiate a separate peace in Asia. With a ceasefire in Korea in July 1953, the French government pressed its allies to consider a new strategy in Indochina that could eventually unburden France. Negotiation constituted only one aspect of this plan. The French military and political leadership hoped that a last great offensive effort might tip the negotiations in favor of France.